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Testimony of Rebecca Ingber 
Associate Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law 
 
Before the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary 
On the Nomination of Brett Kavanaugh for Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court 
 
September 7, 2018 
 
 
Chairman Grassley, Ranking Member Feinstein, and Members of the Committee: thank you for the 
invitation to testify as you consider the nomination of Judge Brett Kavanaugh to the Supreme Court.   
 
I am an associate professor at the Boston University School of Law, where I write and teach about 
executive power, international law, and national security, and a Senior Fellow at The Center on Law 
and Security at NYU School of Law.  Previously, I served for several years in the U.S. government 
as an attorney-adviser in the U.S. Department of State Office of the Legal Adviser, where I advised 
the State Department and worked with colleagues at the Departments of Justice and Defense, in the 
intelligence community, and at the White House, on issues of international law and the President’s 
war powers. 
 
I am honored to speak to the committee about these matters as you consider Judge Kavanaugh’s 
nomination to the Supreme Court.  Judge Kavanaugh has had an exceptional career, and has many 
obvious strengths.  Nevertheless, I believe there are concerns his jurisprudence raises that should be 
addressed before final consideration of his nomination.  My testimony will focus on two: First, I will 
discuss Judge Kavanaugh’s reluctance to impose checks on the President in the national security 
realm, and the harms in undue deference for national security decision-making and government 
accountability.  Second, I will address Judge Kavanaugh’s unusually dismissive views on the role of 
international law in the U.S. domestic system, and in particular, international law’s role in construing 
the limits Congress sets on the President’s authority.  Taken together, should they be adopted by the 
Supreme Court, these approaches could result in a President wielding essentially unfettered power at 
the mere invocation of war or national security.  Both put him at odds with the judicial philosophy 
of Justice Kennedy, whom Judge Kavanaugh has been nominated to replace.  The difference in their 
judicial approaches is stark and significant, both to the separation of powers and to the United 
States’ reputation on the world stage.  Should he be confirmed, Judge Kavanaugh may be in a 
position for decades to restrict the ability of courts and Congress to check the President, and to 
shape how the United States engages with and defines international law. 
 
National Security Deference to the President 
 
I will turn first to Judge Kavanaugh’s approach to deference to the President in the national security 
sphere, and the consequences of such deference for the national security decision-making of the 
executive branch.  I spent several years working in the government on the receiving end of this 
deference, as an attorney within the executive branch working on national security matters under 
two presidential administrations.  During that time, I had a front row seat to how the executive 
branch grapples with national security litigation, and my experience from my government service 
informs my views on these matters. 
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Judge Kavanaugh’s opinions reveal that he is exceedingly reluctant to impose checks on the 
President in the national security sphere, including by declining to impose congressional limits on 
Presidential action.  He has referred generally to his approach as deference toward the political 
branches—the President and Congress—together, and indeed he has expressed in his scholarship the 
view that Congress has a strong constitutional role to play in war powers decisions.  But his judicial 
opinions suggest that he is not inclined to take a neutral position as between Congress and the 
President even in the face of congressional legislation.  In fact, Judge Kavanaugh has set an 
extremely high bar for finding that Congress has spoken to constrain the President’s war powers or 
where the President invokes national security.1  And he has set a low bar for finding that Congress 
has empowered the President.2  Furthermore, Judge Kavanaugh has suggested that the President 
holds significant Constitutional authority to act unilaterally in wartime, without Congress, and that as 
a result, courts must broadly construe any statutory grant of power to the President in this area.3  
The result is that—in stark contrast to Justice Kennedy, who regularly authored or joined opinions 
upholding limits on the President’s wartime powers—Judge Kavanaugh has almost never found 
occasion for constraining the President in the national security space. 
 
It is therefore worth reflecting on what this level of extraordinary deference to the government in 
the national security sphere looks like, and the effect it has on government decision-making and on 
the rights of the individuals affected by these decisions.  
 
In this section, I will first discuss why judicial review is so important to Presidential accountability 
on matters of national security specifically.  Second, I will address some of the myths surrounding 
national security decision-making and beliefs about the necessity for aggressive deference from the 
courts.  Third, I will discuss why the particularities of executive branch decision-making in litigation 
make it critical that national security adjudication have real teeth, and not just be a rubber stamp on 
the positions the government pursues zealously in the context of defensive litigation. 
 
The Importance of Judicial Review of National Security Decisions 
 
The importance of judicial review of the President’s national security decisions comes down to this: 
litigation is one of the very few lawful vehicles that provides a check on the President’s power, and 
accountability for harms to individuals who typically have no other recourse, ideally divorced from 
partisan politics. 
                                               
1 See, e.g., Rattigan v. Holder, 689 F.3d 764 (2012)(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting)(arguing that the court 
should not review claims under the Civil Rights Act where the alleged retaliation involved reporting 
security concerns); El-Shifa Pharmaceutical Industries Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 858 (D.C. Cir. 
2010) (en banc) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring)(“courts must be cautious about interpreting an 
ambiguous statute to constrain or interfere with the Executive Branch’s conduct of national security 
or foreign policy”). 
2 See, e.g., Ali v. Obama, 736 F.3d 542 (2013)(finding that the 2001 AUMF grants the President to 
detain individuals who—in the words of Judge Edwards’ concurrence—“is not someone who 
transgressed the provisions of the AUMF or the NDAA.”)  Judge Edwards thus argued that Judge 
Kavanaugh’s opinion and the precedents he had joined “stretched the meaning of the AUMF and 
the NDAA so far beyond the terms of these statutory authorizations that habeas corpus proceedings 
… are functionally useless.”  Id. 
3 El-Shifa, supra, at 858-59 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring)(“The Executive plainly possesses a significant 
degree of exclusive, preclusive Article II power in both the domestic and national security arenas.”) 
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Judicial review of the President’s actions is not some modern contrivance, but is rather a 
fundamental component of the separation of powers established by the Framers.  It is a necessary 
means of checking the President, and it is also a means of addressing individual rights and harms, 
particularly when the affected individuals do not have powerful political allies, or when protecting 
those individuals does not play well in the political moment.  In the national security context, in 
particular, the individuals whose rights are at stake often have the least political power to remediate 
their harms in any way other than through the courts. 
 
Moreover, judicial review is all the more critical in the national security space because so much of 
what the executive branch does in this sphere takes place in secret.  But secret or not, these actions 
often have a direct impact on real people’s lives.  When a judge says that a matter is not for courts to 
decide but should instead be left to the accountable branches, we need to then ask, how precisely—
and by whom—is this branch being held accountable?  One way we hold these branches 
accountable is through public scrutiny.  And yet public scrutiny is often impossible when so many of 
the government’s actions are taken in secret.   
 
Thus, one of the few tools available for holding the executive branch accountable for actions taken 
in the name of national security is lawsuits brought by people who feel they have been harmed by 
the government’s policies, which can then be litigated in a non-politicized forum.   
 
This is not to say that we have to attribute bad faith to executive branch actors in order to deem 
judicial review important.  In my experience there is a great deal of thoughtful decision-making that 
happens inside the executive branch national security apparatus.  There is often significant, robust 
process and debate that accompanies major decisions, and executive actors grapple with legal rules 
that they interpret to constrain themselves even in areas where the courts may never tread, and even 
when the legal rules or interpretations are those that the executive branch has itself established.   
 
But sometimes, even a robust process can lead to Presidential overreach.  After all, the premise of 
the separation of powers is that each branch will seek to enhance its own authority, and the other 
branches (including the courts) are there to impose limits.  And sometimes the process itself is 
lacking.  Mistakes happen.  Bad decisions may come about through incompetence, insufficiency of 
facts, exigency, and even, yes, through the intentional abuse of power.   
 
The executive branch, in short, has to be held to account, and it must be held to account by some 
source outside itself: by the courts, by Congress, and by civil society.  Even for officials acting with 
the best intentions, the fire drill of government life at the highest levels means that officials will not 
always have or take the opportunity to revisit decisions, even poorly or insufficiently processed 
decisions, unless forced to do so by some external trigger.  And litigation is one of the few available 
triggers for doing so.  But litigation is not costless, even for actors seeking to hold the government 
accountable, and it can in fact have perverse effects when litigation occurs in a context in which 
judges are not inclined to impose real checks on the President.  I will discuss below the effect of 
litigation on impelling an aggressively defensive posture in executive branch decision-making, which 
makes it critical that judicial review have real teeth. 
 
Myths Surrounding Judicial Review of National Security Issues 
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Before I turn to that, I will first address the arguments that tend to underlie deference to the 
President on matters of national security, and that animate much judicial deference in this realm, 
including in Judge Kavanaugh’s own decisions.  These arguments focus on institutional competence: 
that national security matters are somehow different than other areas, and that the President is best 
placed to make expedient, expert decisions on matters that require immediate attention and could 
affect the safety of citizens and residents of this country or the use of force abroad. 
 
On this, I think it’s important to pull away the veil of mystery draped over national security law.  
First, when national security matters receive a heightened level of deference to the executive, this 
incentivizes the President to classify more and more activity as coming within the national security 
ambit.  “National security” is often an overbroad, malleable term.  For example, does addressing the 
abuse alleged in the Meshal case, of an American citizen by FBI agents overseas, demand a different 
set of rules than other cases of abuse, simply because the government asserts “national security” 
concerns?4  Should the President’s claim of national security prerogative change the U.S. citizen’s 
rights or remedy?  If so, why?  Crafting a deference policy that is triggered whenever the President 
cites national security or foreign actions is not merely a neutral policy of waiting for the political 
branches to weigh in.  In practice, it can mean casting aside normal process and established rights in 
favor of the executive branch, at the utterance of the magic words “national security” or “war.”  
And yet, despite government claims to the contrary, very few—if any—activities for which the 
President claims national security deference involve matters where the nation’s security will actually 
turn on whether the President’s actions are reviewable in court, or whether remedies are provided 
for abuses and overreach.   
 
Second, while some national security actions obviously do require expedience, many do not.  
Expedience is an argument that the executive branch often uses to stave off interference from the 
courts, but it is not otherwise a common feature of executive branch action.  We were told that 
battlefield exigencies necessitated holding detainees as combatants without judicial review.  
Ultimately, detainees at Guantanamo (many of whom were not in fact captured on a battlefield) did 
receive review, some in multiple fora, and the sky did not fall.  We were told that military 
commissions were necessary to try the 9/11 attackers in order to bring them to justice quickly.  A 
decade and a half later, we are still waiting for that military commission to get off the ground.  And 
we are told time and again that the exigencies of war demand that the President have urgent 
flexibility in determining the scope of the conflict, and thus do not permit him to return to Congress 
to update the now seventeen-year-old use of force statute, each time he intends to bring a new 
group into its ambit.  ISIS, which we are currently fighting, did not exist at the time that Congress 
enacted that 2001 statute, but the President tells us it must come within its scope.  The President is 
as we speak detaining a U.S. citizen under this theory.  We have been fighting ISIS now for over 
four years.  We have been holding this U.S. citizen for a year.  There has been time to review this 
decision in court, and there has been time for the President to go to Congress.  
 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, arguments about national security deference focus on the 
executive branch’s unique expertise.  Here, I think there is a great deal of truth to the argument.  
                                               
4 Meshal v. Higgenbotham, 804 F.3d 417, 429-30 (2015) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring)(arguing against the 
application of a Bivens remedy to a case where a U.S. citizen alleged abuse in detention by FBI 
officers abroad, based on “extraterritoriality and national security,” and because such extension 
would render “U.S. officials undoubtedly … more hesitant in investigating and interrogating 
suspected al Qaeda members abroad.”) 
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The executive branch as a whole—operating as it does the war machinery of the state, intelligence 
collection and analysis, diplomacy and foreign policy, not to mention the system of classification 
keeping so much of this operation secret—surely holds within it a significant advantage in expertise 
over the courts on matters of national security.  But this, too, can be overstated.  The courts deal 
with many complicated and sensitive issues—consider mob trials, or terrorism trials in Article III 
courts, which have as yet been quicker and more successful than military commissions—and the 
three branches have found ways to accommodate judicial review in these contexts. 
 
Executive Positions in National Security Litigation 
 
Moreover—and this caveat may swallow the government’s expertise-related advantages—this wealth 
of national security expertise is not necessarily responsible for any given position the executive 
branch takes in court. 
 
What do I mean by this?  As I mention above, litigation forces the government to revisit its prior 
acts.  But once the government is facing a legal challenge, it does not revisit those acts in a vacuum, 
in which it seeks the “best view” of the law or policy that it might have taken in advance of the 
challenged conduct.  Instead, once the executive branch faces a lawsuit, all forces—down to which 
officials within the executive branch draft the argument or hold decision-making authority—align to 
shape the government’s legal position from a defensive crouch.   
 
What this means in practice is that the government’s legal position in national security litigation will 
be aggressively protective of the government’s prior decisions and actions.  Defensive litigation over 
the President’s national security policies is not an area where the government is inclined to give any 
ground.  Department of Justice litigators who take the lead in these cases view their role in narrow 
terms: their job, as they see it, is to protect executive power and flexibility for the policy-makers, and 
refuse to concede an inch, even if the policymakers themselves do not support the underlying 
policies or would not take the underlying actions were the decision to come to them anew.  
 
Accordingly, what judges tend to view as the executive’s well-considered legal position is often 
instead not the result of an expert-led robust process to come to the “best view” of the law, but 
instead simply a zealously-pursued litigation position, heavily shaped by litigators. 
 
Moreover, much as Judge Kavanaugh views deference to the executive as pursuing a limited role for 
judges in the national security space, the reality is that the executive branch looks to the courts to 
understand the parameters of its authority.  Once a court defers to the President in a given case, the 
argument that the executive branch had made before the court that the court finds sufficient 
becomes baked into the executive branch’s understanding of the law, even if the court only intended 
to defer to the executive’s power to define those parameters itself.  The court’s deference thus has 
the effect of a merits decision, which becomes the law for the executive branch going forward.  
When a judge weighing whether the government has met its burden in that regard rules that, for 
example, staying at a particular guest house in Afghanistan, at which the government claims certain 
members of al Qaeda resided, is “overwhelming” evidence,5 he may intend merely that this is 
enough to permit the government to go ahead and make its own unilateral determination about the 
individual’s proper status.  But the government is likely to read this not as mere deference but as a 
status determination itself, and moreover, as an assessment of the necessary facts to make that status 
                                               
5 Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866 (2010). 
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determination going forward.  In other words, there is a tendency in the government to see judicial 
ratification of the principle that staying at this guest house or one similarly situated as sufficient to 
make someone an enemy combatant.  The results of such a status?  For many in the executive 
branch, that would mean that the President could not only detain such a person—indefinitely, for 
now, as there does not seem to be an end in sight to the conflict—but also target and kill him.   
 
What this “limited role” for courts in the national security realm means in practice is that the court 
defers to the government’s aggressive litigation position, crafted to maximally protect presidential 
power, which then becomes the judicially-ratified law that the government follows going forward.  If 
the courts never push back—and under Judge Kavanaugh’s preferred approach, but contrary to 
Justice Kennedy’s, such pushback would be exceedingly rare—the result will be an ever-ratcheting 
up of executive power, both vis-à-vis the other branches and as against individuals.   
 
One might respond to this reality in a few ways.  First, one might seek to do away with litigation 
entirely and leave the executive branch to decide these matters through internal processes without 
judicial intervention.  But as I note above, the government does make mistakes that impose genuine 
harm on individuals, it makes them in secret, it does not often revisit them, and there are few lawful 
processes outside of litigation to check the President.  Second, this suggests that Congress itself 
needs to act more assertively to create clear checks on the President for the courts to uphold.  
(Congress does grant power to the President against a backdrop of constraints, in particular 
constraints based in international law, but as I will describe in the second section below, Judge 
Kavanaugh has dismissed these as a check on the President.)  In any event, litigation shines a 
spotlight on government action that almost no other mechanisms can match.  
 
Thus, the third option—which to my view is essential alongside Congressional engagement—is for 
judicial review to have real teeth, and for judges to see the government as a litigant in a genuine 
adversarial process, where the President has a real prospect of losing. 
 
This is the crux of the matter when considering extremely deferential judicial leanings in this space.  
For national security litigation to operate as a real check on the President, it is not enough to simply 
bring the parties into court and rubber stamp the executive branch’s litigation position.  In fact, 
extreme deference to the executive branch is often—for the reasons I discuss above—worse than 
no judicial review at all.  
 
International Law as United States Law  
 
Next, and relatedly, I would urge the committee to consider the positions that Judge Kavanaugh has 
taken seeking to dismiss or severely limit the role of international law in the U.S. legal system.  Judge 
Kavanaugh’s position on the limited role for courts in considering international law is highly relevant 
to his position on the limited role for courts in checking the President.  In wartime, international 
law—law that the United States itself played an outsized role in crafting and convincing other 
nations to adopt—often provides the most important set of clear rules checking the President’s legal 
authority.  It has been the longstanding approach of all three branches of government that statutes 
must be construed in light of international law—including international law limits on the President’s 
wartime conduct—and it is the approach the Supreme Court takes to this day, and which Justice 
Kennedy has consistently adopted.  If the Court were instead to adopt Judge Kavanaugh’s approach 
rejecting such limits, the courts would have little recourse for interpreting the limits of the 
President’s power in wartime. 
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This is not an area where Judge Kavanaugh has merely followed precedent with his hands tied.  
Rather, he has gone to great lengths to dismiss the role of international law as a legal constraint even 
on the President’s war powers, in the face of longstanding precedents to the contrary, and even 
where the majority of his colleagues have found his position unnecessary to the merits of the case.  I 
will focus in particular here on Judge Kavanaugh’s dismissal of the role of international law in 
shaping the courts’ and the political branches’ interpretation of statutes generally, and the President’s 
war powers specifically. 
 
Under longstanding precedent, even those international law norms that are not judicially enforceable 
in the first instance as a rule of decision form the backdrop against which courts must engage with 
statutes, and this is all the more true for statutes governing the President’s war powers.  For more 
than 200 years, under what is known as the Charming Betsy canon of construction, it is a well-
established rule – as Justice Scalia reiterated in his dissent in Hartford Fire – that in the absence of a 
clear statement by Congress to the contrary, the courts will assume that Congress intended for the 
United States to comply with its international law obligations, rather than read a statute to violate 
international law.6  Judge Kavanaugh has written that he would reject that rule, and would instead 
hold that courts have no role in interpreting an ambiguous statute with reference to international law 
unless Congress makes a clear statement that they must.7 
 
This position is all the more untenable in the war powers context, where all three branches of 
government have looked to international law to define war powers over the entire course of this 
nation’s history.8  The concept of “war” itself, and thus the Constitution’s allocation of war powers, 
have always been understood against the backdrop of what war and force mean on the international 
plane.  When Congress authorizes the President to use all “necessary and appropriate” force, it does 
so against the backdrop of that history.  Indeed, Presidents have consistently interpreted their war 
powers in line with international law, and the Supreme Court has ratified this understanding 
repeatedly, including in opinions that Justice Kennedy joined.9 
 
Perhaps because these rules have always guided our understanding, international law is one of the 
only tools the courts and the political branches have for interpreting war powers.   
This means that international law is often the only limiting principle for interpreting the outer 
bounds of the President’s wartime authorities.  
 
This is not only a matter of constraint on the President.  The use of international law as an 
interpretive tool to shape Constitutional or statutory powers can have both constraining and 
permissive effects on the President’s powers.  The President and the Supreme Court both have long 
looked to international law to construe the outer limits of the President’s wartime authority 
expansively as well as narrowly, and even to override what would otherwise be the normal operation 
of other domestic constitutional or statutory protections.  For example, in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, a case 
involving a U.S. citizen detained by the U.S. government on U.S. soil, the government argued that 
                                               
6 Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch 64, 118 (1804) (Marshall, C. J.); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. 
California, 509 U.S. 764, 815 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
7 Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). 
8 See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814); Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 
(1863). 
9 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 US 507 (2004); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
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the President’s wartime detention authority derived from both the U.S. constitution and statute, and 
was non-reviewable.10  The Supreme Court disagreed with that overly aggressive position, but 
nevertheless found that the President’s authority to use force under a congressional statute—the 
2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force, which did not mention detention—implicitly 
granted the President authority to detain U.S. citizens.  The Court read this implicit authority to 
detain into the statute even though a prior statute—the Non-Detention Act of 1971—prohibited 
detention of citizens without a clear act of Congress, and even though the Constitution calls for 
specific processes to be followed before the government may restrict an individual’s liberty.  The 
Court nevertheless held, in a plurality opinion joined by Justice Kennedy, that the 2001 AUMF 
authorized detention by looking to the international laws of war, which both recognizes detention as 
incident to war and which imposes constraints on that power to detain.  Justice Kennedy joined the Hamdi 
Court in incorporating these international law constraints—such as that detention may last only until 
the end of hostilities—into what the statute means when it authorizes “appropriate” uses of force. 
 
When the President uses force in wartime, he or she is acting outside the normal operation of 
domestic law in numerous ways.  But once the courts accept that the law is different in war or 
“armed conflict,” and that the President has a prominent role in discerning the line between war and 
not-war, it is critical to identify limiting principles on what the President can do.  
 
One of the only limiting principles that the executive branch itself has advanced time and again, as a 
means of reassuring both the courts and Congress that his authority in this realm is not entirely 
unfettered, is compliance with the international laws of war.  These rules do not hamper the 
President’s ability to fight a war, but rather prohibit conduct that centuries of experience dictates 
falls outside of what humanity will tolerate.  And they are not rules imposed by some outside source.  
They are instead rules states have agreed to be bound by, specifically in wartime.  Rules prohibiting 
torture.  Rules prohibiting the detention of individuals after hostilities have ended.  Rules prohibiting 
the intentional targeting of civilians.  And the United States in particular has always played an 
outsized role in shaping these rules.  We do not agree and have not agreed to rules for war that do 
not serve our interests, and that we do not intend to follow.  
 
Judge Kavanaugh would have courts ignore these rules in interpreting the President’s wartime 
statutory (and constitutional) authority.  He views them as merely precatory—important for the 
President to follow, perhaps, as a matter of good policy, but not commitments with the force of 
judicially enforceable law.  What is more, he would have the courts ignore these rules even in 
considering the otherwise open-ended “necessary and appropriate force” Congress generally 
authorizes the President to use in war.  The result, should the Supreme Court adopt Judge 
Kavanaugh’s approach, would be virtually no limiting principles on what the President can do in 
war, at least as far as the courts are concerned. 
 
Yet it is the province of the courts to say what the law is.  The question is not whether international 
law is binding law on the United States, which it unarguably is and will always be.  The question is 
whether the U.S. Supreme Court will continue to play a role in interpreting that international law 
and the President’s war powers against the backdrop of those rules, as it always has.  Judge 
Kavanaugh’s opinions suggest that the United States need not honor these commitments as law, and 
that Congress does not presumptively intend to ensure U.S. compliance with such law, but that they 
are merely political promises that can be ignored as political realities demand. 
                                               
10 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 US 507 (2004). 
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It is essential, especially today, that the United States present a strong message to the world: we 
honor our legal commitments.  The Supreme Court is a key player in this arena, and Judge 
Kavanaugh’s opinions on international law going forward will have real salience on the world stage.  
Despite the Judge’s limited view of the judicial role in this sphere, the reality is that all three 
branches have a role to play in matters of international law.  The Supreme Court is frequently taken 
to speak for the United States when it issues pronouncements on international law, which are then 
understood as the U.S. position by international tribunals and foreign courts looking for evidence of 
opinio juris.  And the Supreme Court’s opinions on the domestic status of our international 
obligations have a significant effect on the extent to which the United States is able to honor those 
commitments.  For all of these reasons, the Supreme Court’s pronouncements on the role of 
international law in the U.S. domestic system have real effects internationally, and may cause states 
to question the extent to which the United States is able to keep its promises.  Should he be 
confirmed, Judge Kavanaugh’s positions on international law will have a world audience.  I would 
therefore urge the committee to consider and to impress upon Judge Kavanaugh the importance of 
upholding the Charming Betsy canon and the well-established role of international law in interpreting 
war powers as longstanding precedent against which this body legislates, as well as the rhetorical 
importance of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in demonstrating to the world the United States’ 
commitment to the rule of law. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This is a dangerous time for the separation of powers.  Many are looking to the courts as the last 
bulwark against a President who often shows a casual disregard for the rule of law and the 
longstanding norms that represent good government.  This Committee should ask Judge Kavanaugh 
to make clear that, should he be confirmed, he will hold the President accountable for his national 
security decisions that violate the Constitution or statutory constraints.  Congress, too, should 
assertively legislate clear constraints in this arena.  Judge Kavanaugh has in his scholarship exhibited 
support for some role for Congress in national security, as long as congressional statutes are loud 
and clear.  We also know that he sees constitutional limits to Congress’s ability to constrain the 
President in this space, and we do not know where he would draw that line, although his 
jurisprudence suggests it will favor the President.11  I would urge that the Committee seek to assure 
itself in this regard that Judge Kavanaugh would support congressional checks on Presidential power 
should he be confirmed to the Supreme Court.  And then I would urge you to consider legislative 
means for checking the President where the courts, under Judge Kavanaugh’s approach, may 
otherwise step aside. 
 
                                               
11 El-Shifa, supra, at 858 (“if a statute were passed that clearly limited the kind of Executive national 
security or foreign policy activities at issue in these cases, such a statute as applied might well violate 
Article II”). 
